EASTSIDE MAYHEM
EXERCISE SERIES
After Action Report

Day 1: Govalle
November 1, 2016
# Table of Contents

Exercise Overview .................................................................................................................. 7  
Executive Summary ............................................................................................................... 13  
Capability Analysis .............................................................................................................. 19  
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 27  
Appendices .......................................................................................................................... 31
EXERCISE OVERVIEW
## Exercise Overview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exercise Name</th>
<th>Eastside Mayhem: Day 1—Govalle</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exercise Date</td>
<td>November 1, 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exercise Location</td>
<td>Govalle Water Treatment Plant; Austin, Texas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Scope
This was one of three operations-based regional exercises testing multi-jurisdictional response to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) incidents. This particular exercise included a terrorist incident component as well. This exercise was held for four hours at the Govalle Water Treatment Plant. Players representing key participants of regional CBRNE response drove the action of the exercise, while evaluators followed the process and decision making sequence. During the exercise, evaluators witnessed and documented the response actions of multiple agencies as they approached and responded to the realistic scenario.

### Purpose
To validate current policies and procedures, to identify gaps, and to develop potential solutions in order to advance the Capital Area Council of Government (CAPCOG) region's CBRNE procedures and the coordination between multiple agencies.

### Mission Area(s)
Response

### Core Capabilities
- Environmental Response/Health and Safety
- Operational Coordination
- Operational Communications

### Objectives
- Upon arriving at a hazmat incident involving multiple fatalities, the Regional Standardization of Equipment and Training (ReSET) CBRNE group will secure and preserve the scene, ID/classify hazardous materials, and remove casualties from an immediately dangerous to life or health (IDLH) environment.
- The ReSET CBRNE group will coordinate operations amongst all agencies on scene, conduct joint operations using common operating methods and equipment, and will make proper notifications for assistance requests.
- The ReSET CBRNE group will establish common communications with each other and with all other participating agencies as soon as possible upon arrival.

### Threat or Hazard
CBRNE/Terrorist
An eighteen-wheel box truck is transporting hazardous materials to businesses in the United States from Mexico. Inside the truck, in the 15 to 20 feet of the trailer closest to cab, are 25 people.

A passerby sees a cloud of smoke and what is determined to be hydrochloric acid coming out of the back of the truck and notices a person on the ground outside of the back door.

Austin Fire Department gets the initial call and puts in a call to San Marcos. San Marcos is called as the first Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Explosive (CBRNE) team.

The San Marcos CBRNE team accesses the truck and discovers dead bodies in the front of the truck. There are many pallets with 55 gallon drums full of chemicals that the team must maneuver through to get to the bodies.

San Marcos contacts the Austin Fire Department and Williamson County for assistance due the length of the call and the need to collect/document evidence in a chemical atmosphere.

Due to the mass fatality, the regional justice of the peace is notified of the incident. The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) is notified of the incident due to the individuals found in the truck. The regional justice of the peace and the medical examiner’s office work with the CBRNE teams to identify the evidence they may need, such as the truck’s cameras, as the bodies are being processed out of the truck.

The deceased victims’ bodies have chemicals that must be removed before being turned over the medical examiner’s office and/or funeral homes. The 6th CBRNE Enhanced Forced Protection (CERFP) is called in to assist with the decontamination of the bodies, using the team’s decontamination trailer.

A complete master scenario events list (MSEL) is available upon request.

Sponsor: Capital Area Council of Governments (CAPCOG)
After-Action Report
Capital Area Council of Governments

November 1, 2016

Overview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Number of Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austin Fire Department (Fire, HazMat, Aerial)</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPCOG</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cedar Park</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP)</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of San Marcos Fire Department</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgetown</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hutto Fire Rescue</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law Enforcement Standardization of Equipment &amp; Training (LESET)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Standardization of Equipment &amp; Training (ReSET)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Round Rock Fire Department Hazardous Materials Team</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS)/Texas Division of Emergency Management (TDEM)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travis County</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Williamson County Communications</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Williamson County EMS</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Williamson County HazMat</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Participating Jurisdictions

Point of Contact

Eric Carter
CAPCOG Homeland Security Director
512-916-6026
ecarter@capcog.org

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Executive Summary

Purpose

On Tuesday, November 1, 2016, the Capital Area Council of Governments (CAPCOG) hosted *Eastside Mayhem: Day 1—Govalle* as part of a three-day exercise series to validate current regional operations in response to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) incidents.

The overall purpose of this regional full scale exercise (FSE) was to enhance the region’s capability to respond to CBRNE incidents through practicing and testing notification procedures, hazard identification, establishing and maintaining unified command, and responding to the exercise scenario according to agency standard operating guidelines (SOGs).

Exercise Goal

The goal of this regional FSE series was to provide regional response organizations within the CAPCOG region the opportunity to assess procedures, validate information, and highlight gaps (both knowledge and processes) related to CBRNE incidents.

Structure

This exercise was one of three FSEs in a series that simulated potential real-world events. Each exercise was proceeded with a participant briefing and exercise site tour and was followed by a hot wash. The exercise began with an inject to call dispatch describing the exercise scenario and concluded four hours later.

Twenty-eight controllers/evaluators observed and captured the events of the exercise. The evaluators were asked to provide responses and feedback after the exercise on overall exercise play, as well as specific information on the identified exercise focus areas.

This after action report and improvement plan (AAR/IP) was developed to document areas of strength and gaps witnessed during the exercise, and potential solutions to those gaps. This information was captured in a formal evaluation, as well as discussed during an after-action meeting held on December 16, 2016.
Exercise Core Capabilities and Objectives

The exercise objectives outlined in Table 1 describe the expected outcomes for the exercise. The objectives were linked to the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA’s) Core Capabilities. The objectives and aligned capabilities were guided by the Exercise Planning Team. A matrix of core capability performance can be found in Appendix C.

Table 1: Exercise Objectives and Associated Capabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core Capability</th>
<th>Exercise Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Response/Health and Safety (HazMat)</td>
<td>Upon arriving at a hazmat incident involving multiple fatalities, the ReSET CBRNE group will secure and preserve the scene, ID/classify hazardous materials, and remove casualties from an IDLH environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Coordination</td>
<td>The ReSET CBRNE group will coordinate operations amongst all agencies on scene, conduct joint operations using common operating methods and equipment, and will make proper notifications for assistance requests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Communications</td>
<td>The ReSET CBRNE group will establish common communications with each other and with all other participating agencies as soon as possible upon arrival.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Summary Analysis

Strengths identified in the exercise include:

1. Exercise players successfully utilized placards and shipping papers.
2. Decontamination (Decon) teams selected and utilized appropriate PPE.
3. CERFP successfully and seamlessly integrated into incident operations and operated under the regional unified command.
4. Exercise players were able to establish unified command promptly upon the arrival of multiple agencies within the command post.
5. Decon teams integrated into the system seamlessly.
6. Regional CBRNE response notifications were made appropriately and quickly.
7. Austin Fire Department (AFD) and Williamson County (Wilco) correctly dispatched channels to ensure local and regional responders had common communications.

Areas for improvement identified in the exercise include:

1. Local response agencies did not have necessary standard equipment in backup response vehicles.
2. Regional response teams did not follow medical monitoring guidelines prior to donning PPE.
3. Regional teams would benefit from having CBRNE incident approach procedures reinforced.
4. Response personnel did not demonstrate standard chemical ID protocols.
5. Operations level first responders did not utilize the standard five step process.
6. Regional teams demonstrated initial challenges integrating operationally.
7. Evidence collection processes and procedures were not consistent between CERFP, law enforcement agencies, and the justice of the peace.
8. Entry teams did not have standard communication equipment and failed to perform adequate checks prior to entry.

The following sections provide an overview of the performance related to each core capability and associated exercise objective, highlighting strengths and areas for improvement.
CAPABILITY ANALYSIS
Capability Analysis

Core Capability 1: Environmental Response/Health and Safety (HazMat)

The strengths and areas for improvement for the core capability aligned to this objective are described in this section. Recommendations associated with areas for improvement are provided in **bold** text.

Associated Objective:
Upon arriving at a CBRNE incident involving multiple fatalities, the ReSET CBRNE group will secure and preserve the scene, ID/classify hazardous materials, and remove casualties from an immediately dangerous to life or health (IDLH) environment.

**Strengths**
The partial capability level can be attributed to the following strengths:

**Strength 1:** Exercise players successfully utilized placards and shipping papers.

**Strength 2:** Decon teams selected and utilized appropriate PPE.

**Areas for Improvement**
The following areas require improvement to achieve the full capability level:

**Area of Improvement 1:**
Local response agencies did not have necessary standard equipment in backup response vehicles.

**Analysis:**
Observers noted equipment deficits in responding teams during the exercise that could have been hazardous in a real event. Specifically, one team lacked radiation pagers and pH/fluoride paper when entering the site. In observations following the exercise, the lack of equipment was attributed to using a backup truck during the exercise, but nevertheless could had been detrimental in a real-world event. **Standard equipment and equipment checklists for each truck should be present to ensure even backup trucks have the right equipment, including the appropriate number of radiation pagers and pH/fluoride paper. If not enough of this equipment exists in agencies’ caches, enough should be acquired to stock all trucks.**

**Area of Improvement 2:**
Regional response teams did not follow medical monitoring guidelines prior to donning PPE.

**Analysis:**
In response to the exercise scenario, players appropriately chose Level A suits for use during the exercise. However, players failed to perform the required medical evaluations before suiting up and preparing to
approach the incident. PPE, especially Level A, creates added physiological stress for the individuals wearing it. As such, teams must go through the proper medical evaluation to ensure they are physically in a state suitable to be wearing and conducting operations in PPE. Neglecting to conduct this evaluation allows for the possibility of potential avoidable danger to responders during the incident. **Local jurisdictions should reinforce PPE donning/doffing procedures, including required medical evaluations, through the development and facilitation of trainings.**

**Area of Improvement 3:**
Regional teams would benefit from having CBRNE incident approach procedures reinforced.

**Analysis:**
Guidelines for approaching a CBRNE incident involves entry teams taking an uphill, upwind approach. While some teams took proper precaution, evaluators identified gaps in following this procedure. Entry objectives were not firmly established before the first entry team approached, which normal protocol would dictate. Teams were also seen entering simulated chemical smoke, resulting in unnecessary risk. While the smoke used for simulation in the exercise was the same used for responders during simulated fires, for the purposes of the exercise, players should not have walked into the smoke without knowing if it was hazardous. Lastly, while teams did properly select to setup AreaRAEs for the incident, the AreaRAEs were setup too far from the tanker for maximum benefits. **Local jurisdictions should reinforce training regarding entry into CBRNE incidents.**

**Area of Improvement 4:**
Response personnel did not demonstrate standard chemical ID protocols.

**Analysis:**
Standard guidelines state that in identifying proper classification of an unknown hazardous substance, after the preliminary reading of the placard, responders should utilize Spilfyter® chemical classifier strips along with pH/fluoride paper in the initial assessment, then HazMat 360 as the final step in chemical classification. While responders identified the chemical using the placard on the tanker and performed analysis with pH paper, standard protocol should still be followed to fully classify the chemical. **Additional training should be provided to reinforce standard protocols relating to chemical ID and classification.**

**Area of Improvement 5:**
Operations level first responders did not utilize the standard five step process.

**Analysis:**
Standard guidelines within the region require response personnel to follow the standard five step process following a CBRNE incident. Several exercise incidents occurred because of deviation from this protocol. First, backup responders lacked proper equipment, including rad pagers and pH paper. Next, exercise participants were initially confused when encountering the bodies at the exercise site, failing to attempt to rescue. Both incidents would have been avoidable if the 5-step process would have been followed. **Local jurisdictions should undertake a training and exercise initiative to practice and reinforce the 5-step process, primarily with operations level responders.**
Core Capability 2: Operational Coordination

The strengths and areas for improvement for the core capability aligned to this objective are described in this section. Recommendations associated with areas for improvement are provided in bold text.

Associated Objective:
The ReSET CBRNE group will coordinate operations amongst all agencies on scene, conduct joint operations using common operating methods and equipment, and will make proper notifications for assistance requests.

Strengths
The partial capability level can be attributed to the following strengths:

**Strength 1:** CERFP successfully and seamlessly integrated into incident operations and operated under the regional unified command.

**Strength 2:** Exercise players were able to establish unified command promptly upon the arrival of multiple agencies within the command post.

**Strength 3:** Decon teams integrated into the system seamlessly.

Areas for Improvement
The following areas require improvement to achieve the full capability level:

**Area of Improvement 1:**
Regional teams demonstrated initial challenges integrating operationally.

**Analysis:**
Exercise evaluators noted there was a long period of time after command had given the order to make entry before the first entry was made. This may have been due partially to last-minute exercise player modifications, but also can be attributed to unfamiliarity between the teams and confusion over roles and responsibilities. This issue was amplified with the further inclusion of military personnel. Teams within the region would benefit from additional training on unified command procedures.

**Area of Improvement 2:**
Evidence collection processes and procedures were not consistent between CERFP, law enforcement agencies, and the justice of the peace.

**Analysis:**
Currently, evidence collection is performed under different processes and procedures between various local agencies and military responders. During the exercise, the differences in body decontamination and evidence collection resulted in a lack of coordinated effort, which potentially could have resulted in a loss.
of evidence. To ensure that local evidence collection procedures are met, the region should create procedures to allow for a unified effort between CERFP, the local justice of the peace, and all law enforcement agencies. To reinforce these procedures, CERFP needs to be trained in evidence collection and processes to allow for improved integration with local agencies.
Core Capability 3: Operational Communications

The strengths and areas for improvement for the core capability aligned to this objective are described in this section. Recommendations associated with areas for improvement are provided in bold text.

Associated Objective:
The ReSET CBRNE group will establish common communications with each other and with all other participating agencies as soon as possible upon arrival.

Strengths
The partial capability level can be attributed to the following strengths:

Strength 1: Regional CBRNE response notifications were made appropriately and quickly.

Strength 2: Austin Fire Department (AFD) and Williamson County correctly dispatched channels to ensure local and regional responders had common communications.

Areas for Improvement
The following areas require improvement to achieve the full capability level:

Area of Improvement 1:
Enter teams did not have standard communication equipment and failed to perform adequate checks prior to entry.

Analysis:
Ensuring properly functioning communication equipment is an essential task prior to entering CBRNE incidents. Evaluators noted that the first entry team only had one radio for two people and that one radio was not working. Standard protocol is one radio per person and three radio checks prior to entry. Had this occurred in a real-world situation, these responders would have been in the midst of managing a CBRNE incident without a means to communicate with anyone else at the site. To ensure properly functioning communication equipment, local agencies should train on standard equipment procedures prior to entry. Entry teams must be equipped with adequate communications equipment prior to entry to ensure that communication is maintained.
CONCLUSION
Conclusion

Eastside Mayhem: Day 1—Govalle

This exercise provided a unique opportunity to integrate regional and local jurisdictional CBRNE response agencies in a FSE activity. Participants were able to engage in notification procedures to correct response agencies, recognize situational hazards, establish unified command, and perform activities according to SOGs to meet the exercise’s needs. Exercise players and observers were able to identify areas of improvement relating to training, equipment, and operational guidelines. The findings provide regional and local agencies with an adequate focus for future trainings to improve upon, including entry and approach principles, chemical ID and classification protocols, the five-step process, unified command, and unified evidence collection. Corrective actions also suggest that the need for additional equipment and procedures for regional and local jurisdictional CBRNE response agencies exists.

Response agencies were able to successfully support the incident’s needs with an effective and efficient response. By adding additional training, equipment, and procedures in the exercise’s areas of improvement, regional response teams will be better able to properly address future CBRNE situations.
## Appendices

### Appendix A: Acronyms

Table 2: Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Term</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAR/IP</td>
<td>After Action Report/Improvement Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFD</td>
<td>Austin Fire Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPCOG</td>
<td>Capital Area Council of Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRNE</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERFP</td>
<td>CBRNE Enhanced Forced Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decon</td>
<td>Decontamination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEMA</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSE</td>
<td>Full Scale Exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HazMat</td>
<td>Hazardous Materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDLH</td>
<td>Immediately dangerous to life or health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LESET</td>
<td>Law Enforcement Standardization of Equipment &amp; Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSEL</td>
<td>Master Scenario Events List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOAA</td>
<td>National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPE</td>
<td>Personal Protective Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ReSET</td>
<td>Regional Standardization of Equipment and Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOGs</td>
<td>Standard Operating Guidelines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDEM</td>
<td>Texas Division of Emergency Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilco</td>
<td>Williamson County</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B: Capabilities Defined

The core capabilities addressed in this exercises are defined below.

Table 3: Core Capabilities Defined

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core Capability</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Response/Health</td>
<td>Conduct appropriate measures to ensure the protection of the health and safety of the public and workers, as well as the environment, from all-hazards in support of responder operations and the affected communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Safety (HazMat)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Coordination</td>
<td>Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Communication</td>
<td>Ensure the capacity for timely communications in support of security, situational awareness, and operations by any and all means available, among and between affected communities in the impact area and all response forces.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C: Capability Analysis Matrix

Aligning exercise objectives and Core Capabilities provides a consistent taxonomy for evaluation that transcends individual exercises to support preparedness reporting and trend analysis. Table 2 includes the exercise objectives, aligned Core Capabilities, and performance ratings for each core capability as observed during the exercise and determined by the evaluation team.

Table 4: Analysis of Core Capabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Core Capability</th>
<th>Performed without Challenges (P)</th>
<th>Performed with Some Challenges (S)</th>
<th>Performed with Major Challenges (M)</th>
<th>Unable to be Performed (U)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Upon arriving at a hazmat incident involving multiple fatalities, the ReSET HazMat group will secure and preserve the scene, ID/classify hazardous materials, and remove casualties from an IDLH environment.</td>
<td>Environmental Response/Health and Safety (HazMat)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The ReSET HazMat Group will coordinate operations amongst all agencies on scene, conduct joint operations using common operating methods and equipment, and will make proper notifications for assistance requests.</td>
<td>Operational Coordination</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>S</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. ReSET HazMat group will establish common communications with each other and with all other participating agencies as soon as possible upon arrival.</td>
<td>Operational Communications</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>S</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ratings Definitions:

- **Performed without Challenges (P):** The targets and critical tasks associated with the core capability were completed in a manner that achieved the objective(s) and did not negatively impact the performance of other activities. Performance of this activity did not contribute to additional health and/or safety risks for the public or for emergency workers, and it was conducted in accordance with applicable plans, policies, procedures, regulations, and laws.
- **Performed with Some Challenges (S):** The targets and critical tasks associated with the core capability were completed in a manner that achieved the objective(s) and did not negatively impact the performance of other activities. Performance of this activity did not contribute to additional health and/or safety risks for the public or for emergency workers, and it was conducted in
accordance with applicable plans, policies, procedures, regulations, and laws. However, opportunities to enhance effectiveness and/or efficiency were identified.

- **Performed with Major Challenges (M):** The targets and critical tasks associated with the core capability were completed in a manner that achieved the objective(s), but some or all of the following were observed: demonstrated performance had a negative impact on the performance of other activities; contributed to additional health and/or safety risks for the public or for emergency workers; and/or was not conducted in accordance with applicable plans, policies, procedures, regulations, and laws.

- **Unable to be Performed (U):** The targets and critical tasks associated with the core capability were not performed in a manner that achieved the objective(s).
Appendix D: Improvement Plan

This IP has been developed specifically for CAPCOG region as a result of the *Eastside Mayhem: Day 1—Govalle* conducted on November 1, 2016.

**Figure 1: Analysis of Core Capabilities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capability</th>
<th>Issue/Area for Improvement</th>
<th>Corrective Action</th>
<th>Primary Responsible Organization</th>
<th>Organization POC</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>Completion Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Response/Health and Safety (HazMat)</td>
<td>Local response agencies did not have necessary standard equipment in backup response vehicles.</td>
<td>Develop equipment checklists and ensure all trucks are properly equipped with necessary equipment.</td>
<td>ReSET</td>
<td>ReSET Chair</td>
<td>11/2016</td>
<td>11/2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Acquire additional radiation pagers for agencies’ caches.</td>
<td>ReSET</td>
<td>ReSET Chair</td>
<td>11/2016</td>
<td>11/2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regional response teams did not follow medical monitoring guidelines prior to donning PPE.</td>
<td>Develop and facilitate trainings on proper PPE donning/doffing procedures, including required medical evaluations.</td>
<td>ReSET</td>
<td>ReSET Chair</td>
<td>11/2016</td>
<td>11/2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regional teams would benefit from having HazMat situation approach procedures reinforced.</td>
<td>Reinforce training regarding CBRNE incident entry.</td>
<td>ReSET/LESET</td>
<td>ReSET Chair/LESET Chair</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Response personnel did not demonstrate standard chemical ID protocols.</td>
<td>Provide additional training on standard chemical ID and classification protocols.</td>
<td>ReSET</td>
<td>ReSET Chair</td>
<td>11/2016</td>
<td>11/2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Operations level first responders did not utilize the standard five step process.</td>
<td>Provide trainings and opportunities to exercise the 5-step process for operations level responders.</td>
<td>ReSET</td>
<td>ReSET Chair</td>
<td>11/2016</td>
<td>1/2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability</td>
<td>Issue/Area for Improvement</td>
<td>Corrective Action</td>
<td>Primary Responsible Organization</td>
<td>Organization POC</td>
<td>Start Date</td>
<td>Completion Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operational Coordination</strong></td>
<td>Regional teams demonstrated initial challenges integrating operationally.</td>
<td>Provide additional training on unified command within the region.</td>
<td>CAPCOG</td>
<td>Eric Carter, CAPCOG Homeland Security Director</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Evidence collection processes and procedures were not consistent between CERFP, law enforcement agencies, and the justice of the peace.</td>
<td>Create, train on, and utilize unified evidence collections processes for CERFP, local justices of the peace, and law enforcement agencies.</td>
<td>ReSET/LESET/Joint Terrorism Task Force</td>
<td>ReSET Chair/LESET Chair/JTTF Representative</td>
<td>11/2016</td>
<td>11/2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operational Communications</strong></td>
<td>Entry teams did not have standard communication equipment and failed to perform adequate checks prior to entry.</td>
<td>Reinforce training on communications equipment procedures.</td>
<td>ReSET</td>
<td>ReSET Chair</td>
<td>11/2016</td>
<td>11/2017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>